

# Railroad Hazardous Materials Transportation Risk Management Framework




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**William W. Hay Railroad Engineering Seminar**  
**Rail Transportation and Engineering Center (RailTEC)**

# Outline

- Overview of hazardous materials transportation by rail
- Analytical framework for risk management
  - Accident analysis
    - train accident frequency and severity
    - accident causes
  - Risk analysis
    - modeling of hazardous materials release risk
    - evaluation of risk reduction strategies
  - Decision analysis
    - Optimization of risk reduction strategies
- Proposed dissertation research

## Overview of railroad hazardous materials transportation


- There were 1.7 million rail carloads of hazardous materials (hazmat) in the U.S. in 2010 (AAR, 2011)
- Hazmat traffic account for a small proportion of total rail carloads, but its safety have been placed a high priority




## Safety of railroad hazmat transportation

- 99.998% of rail hazmat shipments reached their destinations without a train-accident-caused release in 2008 (AAR, 2011)
- Train-accident-caused hazmat release rates have declined by about 90% since 1982
  - about 200 cars released per million carloads in 1982
  - about 21 cars released per million carloads in 2010
- Further improvement in the transportation safety remains a high priority of the rail industry and government


# Influence diagram showing relationships of factors affecting hazardous materials transportation safety




# Railroad hazardous materials transportation risk management framework



# Analytical models for risk management



# Analytical models for risk management



- **Train accident frequency and severity**
- **Train accident causes**

- Risk modeling
- Evaluation of risk reduction strategies


- Optimizing a combination of risk reduction strategies

# FRA Rail Equipment Accident (REA) database


- The U.S. Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) Rail Equipment Accident (REA) database records all accidents that exceeded a monetary threshold of damages\*
- The REA database records railroad, accident type, location, accident cause, severity and other information important for accident analysis and prevention
- This study focuses on Class I freight railroads (operating revenue exceeding \$378.8 million in 2009), that account for
  - 68% of U.S. railroad route miles
  - 97% of total ton-miles
  - 94% of total freight rail revenue

*\*It accounts for damage to on-track equipment, signals, track, track structures, and roadbed. The reporting threshold is periodically adjusted for inflation, and has increased from \$7,700 in 2006 to \$9,400 in 2011.*


## Freight-train derailments on Class I mainlines by accident cause group: 2001-2010



# Class I mainline freight-train derailment frequency by cause, 2001-2010




# Frequency-severity graph of Class I mainline freight-train derailments, 2001-2010




# Freight-train derailment severity by cause, Class I mainlines, 2001-2010

### Broken Rails or Welds



### Bearing Failures




\*Include number of locomotives derailed


# Proposed dissertation research in train accident analysis

- Modeling accident-cause-specific accident rate and severity
  - Develop a logistic regression model to estimate the probability that a train accident is due to a specific accident cause
  - Develop a negative binomial regression model to estimate the mean of number of cars derailed
  - Develop a quantile regression model to estimate the quantile distribution (e.g., median) of number of cars derailed
- Evaluate the effectiveness of specific accident prevention strategies

# Analytical models for risk management



# Chain of events leading to hazmat car release



## Modeling hazmat car release rate

$$P(R) = P(A) \times \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^L P(D_i | A) \times \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^J [P(H_{ij} | D_i, A) \times P(R_{ij} | H_{ij}, D_i, A)] \right\} \right\}$$

Where:

$P(R)$  = release rate (number of hazmat cars released per train-mile, car-mile or gross ton-miles)

$P(A)$  = derailment rate (number of derailments per train-mile, car-mile or gross ton-mile)

$P(D_i | A)$  = conditional probability of derailment for a car in  $i^{\text{th}}$  position of a train

$P(H_{ij} | D_i, A)$  = conditional probability that the derailed  $i^{\text{th}}$  car is a type  $j$  hazmat car

$P(R_{ij} | H_{ij}, D_i, A)$  = conditional probability that the derailed type  $j$  hazmat car in  $i^{\text{th}}$  position of a train released


$L$  = train length

$J$  = type of hazmat car


# Mainline train derailment rate, P(A)

- Derailment rate varies by FRA track class, method of operation and annual traffic density (MGT)

Non-Signaled Territory




Signaled Territory



# Car derailment probability by position-in-train

$$P(D_i | A)$$



Source: FRA Rail Equipment Accident (REA) database, 2000-2009, Class I Mainline Derailment, All Accident Causes

## Probability of a hazmat car derailed

$$P(H_{ij} | D_i, A)$$

- The probability that a derailed car contains hazardous materials depends on train length, number of hazmat cars in the train and hazmat car placement
- Given train length and number of hazmat cars in a train, the “worst-case-scenario” is that hazmat cars are placed in the train positions most prone to derailment

## Conditional probability of release when a tank car\* is derailed, $P(R_{ij} | H_{ij}, D_i, A)$

- Conditional probability of release (CPR) of a tank car reflects its resistance to the kinetic energy inflicted on it
- Treichel et al. (2006) developed a logistic regression model to estimate tank car conditional probability of release given tank car configuration
- Kawprasert & Barkan (2010) extended Treichel et al.'s model by accounting for the effect of derailment speed
- Our analysis uses Kawprasert and Barkan's model to estimate the conditional probability of release given tank car type and derailment speed


*\*The majority (73% in 2010) of hazardous materials movements occur in tank cars. In this study, tank car is used as an example to assess hazmat release rate.*

## Application to segment-specific risk analysis

- The model can be used to evaluate segment-specific hazmat release rate and aid to develop and prioritize risk reduction strategies
- Sensitivity analyses were performed to analyze the relationship between tank car release rate and several train-related factors:
  - Train length
  - Number of tank cars in the train
  - Derailment speed

# Estimated tank car release rates by train length and number of tank cars


*Class 3 Track, Non-Signaled, Annual Traffic Density 5-20 MGT*



Tank car type was assumed to be 105J500W

# Estimated tank car release rates by number of tank cars and derailment speed


*Class 3 Track, Non-Signaled, Annual Traffic Density 5-20 MGT*



*Tank car type was assumed to be 105J500W*

# Estimated tank car release rates by train length and derailment speed

*Class 3 Track, Non-Signaled, Annual Traffic Density 5-20 MGT*




*Tank car type was assumed to be 105J500W*

## Summary of risk modeling

- Train length, derailment speed and number of tank cars affect estimated hazmat release rate per train-mile. When all else is equal,
  - A longer train results in a higher release rate
  - A greater derailment speed results in a higher release rate
  - A larger number of tank cars results in a higher release rate
- The model can be used to assess release rates for a variety of track and rolling stock characteristics

# Analytical models for risk management




# Hazardous materials transportation risk reduction strategies

- Basic strategies for reducing the probability of hazmat release incidents include:
  - Reduce tank car derailment rate by preventing various accident causes
  - Reduce release probability of a derailed tank car by enhancing tank car safety design and/or reducing train speed




# Multi-attribute evaluation of risk reduction strategies using Pareto-optimality



# Net present value (NPV) approach to evaluate risk reduction strategies

$$NPV = \sum_{t=0}^T \frac{B_t - C_t}{(1 + A)^t}$$




## Uncertainty in the NPV approach

- The NPV approach may be subject to uncertainty in terms of:
  - definitions of benefits and costs
  - assessment of the effectiveness of risk reduction strategies
  - estimation of economic benefits of safety improvements
  - discount rates
  - study periods
  - track and rolling stock characteristics on different routes
- Due to the uncertainty, the NPV may follow a random distribution


## A hypothetical NPV distribution using Monte Carlo simulation

- It is assumed that
  - annual benefit  $B$  (\$) ~ Normal (1000,100)
  - annual cost  $C$  (\$) ~ Normal (900,100)
  - annual discount rate: 5% in 40 years study period




# Comparison of risk reduction strategies under uncertainty (scenario 1)

- The NPV2 is always greater than NPV1




## Comparison of risk reduction strategies under uncertainty (scenario 2)

- Both NPV distributions have the same mean, but NPV2 has a smaller variance, thus may be preferred



## Comparison of risk reduction strategies under uncertainty (scenario 3)


- NPV2 has a larger mean, also a larger variance. The optimal decision may be based on the consideration of both the mean and variance



# Proposed dissertation research in risk analysis

- Risk modeling
  - Analyze the effect of parameter uncertainty on risk estimation
- Evaluation of risk reduction strategies under uncertainty
  - Consider means to reducing the uncertainty in the cost-benefit analysis
  - Consider the covariance between the benefit and cost estimation

# Analytical models for risk management




- Train accident frequency and severity
- accident causes

- Risk modeling
- Evaluation of risk reduction strategies

- **Optimizing risk reduction strategies**

# An example model to manage the risk of transporting hazardous materials on railroad networks



Source: modified based on Lai et al. (2010)

# Example integrated optimization model

## Model Formulation

$$\min \underbrace{\sum_{(i,j) \in A} \sum_{v \in V} \sum_{q \in Q} H_{ij}^{vq} y_{ij}^{vq}}_{\text{Maintenance cost}} + \underbrace{\sum_{(i,j) \in A} \sum_{k \in K} \sum_{t \in T} C_{ij} x_{ij}^{kt}}_{\text{Transportation cost}} + \underbrace{\sum_{(i,j) \in A} \sum_{v \in V} \sum_{q \in Q} R_{ij}^{vq} y_{ij}^{vq}}_{\text{Risk cost}}$$

Subject to:

$$\sum_{k \in K} \sum_{t \in T} (x_{ij}^{kt} + x_{ji}^{kt}) \leq \sum_{v \in V} \sum_{q \in Q} U_{ij}^q y_{ij}^{vq} \quad \forall (i, j) \in A, (i < j) \quad \left. \vphantom{\sum_{k \in K} \sum_{t \in T} (x_{ij}^{kt} + x_{ji}^{kt})} \right\} \text{Capacity constraint}$$

$$\sum_{v \in V} \sum_{q \in Q} y_{ij}^{vq} = 1 \quad \forall (i, j) \in A, (i < j) \quad \left. \vphantom{\sum_{v \in V} \sum_{q \in Q} y_{ij}^{vq}} \right\} \text{Track class and car composition constraint}$$

$$\sum_{k \in K} (x_{ij}^{kt} + x_{ji}^{kt}) \leq \sum_{v \in V} \sum_{q \in Q} N_t^v y_{ij}^{vq} \quad \forall (i, j) \in A, (i < j), t \in T \quad \left. \vphantom{\sum_{k \in K} (x_{ij}^{kt} + x_{ji}^{kt})} \right\} \text{Linking constraint for decision variables}$$

$$\sum_{j \in \delta^-(j)} x_{ij}^{kt} - \sum_{j \in \delta^+(j)} x_{ji}^{kt} = \begin{cases} D_{kt} z_{kt} & \text{if } i \in s_{kt} \\ -D_{kt} z_{kt} & \text{if } i \in e_{kt} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad \forall i \in N, k \in K, t \in T \quad \left. \vphantom{\sum_{j \in \delta^-(j)} x_{ij}^{kt}} \right\} \text{Flow conservation constraint}$$

$$\sum_{t \in T} z_{kt} = 1 \quad \forall k \in K \quad \left. \vphantom{\sum_{t \in T} z_{kt}} \right\} \text{Car type constraint}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 &x_{ij}^{kt} \in \text{positive integer}, && \forall (i, j) \in A, k \in K, t \in T, \\
 &y_{ij}^{vq} \in \{0, 1\}, && \forall (i, j) \in A, v \in V, q \in Q, \\
 &z_{kt} \in \{0, 1\}, && \forall k \in K, t \in T
 \end{aligned} \quad \left. \vphantom{x_{ij}^{kt}} \right\} \text{Decision Variables Constraint}$$

Source: Lai et al. (2010)

# Proposed dissertation research in decision analysis

- Multi-attribute decision making
  - Develop a multi-attribute utility model to consider risk attitudes and trade-offs among conflicting objectives
- Optimization
  - Consider the interactive effects of various risk reduction strategies
  - Develop an analytical model to identify the optimal set of risk reduction strategies under various constraints and uncertainty

# Acknowledgements

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## Support for Research

